INTRODUCTION

Hamilton
Sundstrand Space Systems International, Inc. (HSSSI) is under contract to NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to develop an Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA). The OGA electrolyzes potable water from the Water Recovery System (WRS) to provide gaseous oxygen to the Space Station module atmosphere for metabolic consumption by crew and biological specimens.
As a byproduct, gaseous hydrogen is generated. Under normal operating conditions, the hydrogen is vented to space or recovered by a Sabatier system which combines the hydrogen with carbon dioxide removed from the cabin air, providing a supplemental water source for the ISS. Under certain failure conditions of the OGA electrolysis cell stack, hydrogen could enter the oxygen outlet stream and be delivered to the cabin, creating a hazard. A Hydrogen Sensor Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) consisting of three separate hydrogen sensors has been incorporated in the OGA design in the oxygen outlet line (Figure 1 ). It functions as a safety device to sense the presence of hydrogen, causing the controller to shut down the system. The three sensors operate independently, providing triple redundancy for system shutdown The hydrogen sensor is a thin-film design based on metal-oxide-semiconductor sensing devices. It utilizes a palladium chrome (Pd/Cr) alloy as a catalyst to disassociate molecular hydrogen. The primary element of the design is a Pd/Cr diode which has electrical properties that change when exposed to atomic hydrogen. The diode responds to low hydrogen concentrations and can accurately sense hydrogen partial pressures ranging from 0 to 2026 pascal (about 0 to 2%).
FLIGHT HARDWARE DESCRIPTION
The electronics for each independent sensor are on their own conduction cooled printed circuit board. Electronic components have been chosen to meet the reliability and radiation tolerance requirements of the program.
The flight hydrogen sensor ORU consists of three independent hydrogen sensors that are housed in-line in a stainless steel manifold containing a flow chamber for the oxygen stream being monitored. Figure 2 shows the sensor system containing three sensors in a manifold and an enclosure that contains the electronics to provide power and process the signal. The overall dimensions of the manifold and enclosure are 8.4" wide x 4.00" deep x 5.25" tall (ORU is 8.4" x 4.15" x 6.23" including the electrical receptacle and quick disconnects The ORU is designed to allow replacement on orbit. The unit is mounted by four captive bolts that mount to the OGA Oxygen Outlet ORU manifold. The oxygen flow path inlet and outlets are attached by means of two quick disconnects.
TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENTS
SENSING TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS
The MEMS based sensing technology used in the ORU was originally developed for detection of a leak in inert environments, therefore the OGA application required an extensive evaluation of the performance of the sensor under conditions representative of on-orbit OGA environment spanning a ten year system life. During the operating lifetime of the OGA system a wide range of gas temperature, dew point, background gas composition on system startup are expected to be encountered.
As the OGA system operating characteristics have become better understood, three key performance issues of the hydrogen sensor have been addressed. First is the operation in high humidity environment. Second is time response of the sensors and third is immunity to condensation. In order to ensure that sensors used for the ORU could achieve the desired operating characteristics, extensive screening of die is conducted at the subassembly level, a five point temperature calibration curve is used to accommodate for non-linearity and sensor uniqueness. Procedural changes were refined to optimize calibration.
Previous work on the system included an evaluation of performance over 180 days of continual operation in a dry oxygen background
[3]. Following that testing, it was determined that dew point of the process oxygen stream from the OGA impacts the reading of the sensor. Additional system operating requirements that impact sensor accuracy were identified as variable background gas composition during normal, but infrequent flushing of the OGA system with nitrogen gas. Failure modes within the OGA can also result in an exposure to nitrogen. The Hydrogen Sensor ORU will accommodate this environment with a quick response during a hydrogen leak event.
Testing of the sensor has confirmed that the primary impact of water vapor in the process stream is related to the absolute. Over the ten year life of the OGA system the process stream dew point may vary from 60 to 85 F due to aging of the electrolysis cell stack. In order to reduce the sensitivity to humidity, two primary changes to the technology described in the Reference 3 paper were undertaken.
First, use of overlapping sensing elements was dropped (i.e. a resistive sensing element was eliminated from the design) and the operating temperature of the diode sensing element was increased from 65 C to approximately 80 C resulting in reduced dew point variation as shown in Figure 3 . At the higher die operating temperature the resistive sensing element did not provide sufficient sensitivity for concentrations under 1% to justify its continued use.
A ...... A key performance parameter for the sensor is time response to hydrogen leaks from the cell stack. To ensure that a flammable mixture cannot reach the crew cabin, the sensors are required to indicate a shutdown level of hydrogen (approximately 1 %) when exposed to a mixture at the lower explosive limit (LEL) of hydrogen (approximately 4% Hydrogen) within six seconds. This time response ensures that the OGA system can close all required valves before any potentially hazardous mixtures are released into the crew cabin. Refer to the simplified schematic of the OGA schematic in Figure 4 . Figure 5 shows a typical time response of the sensor to a step change in hydrogen at typical OGA operating conditions. In order to ensure an adequate yield from screened sensors the system requirement was adjusted from five seconds to six seconds. This relaxed requirement on the sensor did not affect overall system safety. While condensation of water in the hydrogen sensor ORU is not possible under normal operating conditions, it has been determined that there exists the possibility for condensed water to exist in the ORU under certain OGA hardware shut down modes. Tests conducted to assess the impact of condensation on the sensor head showed the potential for damage from electrolysis on the energized elements on the sensor die. Figure 6 shows the results of Gas bubbles evolving from the surface indicate electrolysis from the electrodes operating at potentials up to 5 VDC which exist on the wetted surface of the die. 
FLIGHT AND QUAL UNIT STATUS
RADIATON HARDNESS TESTING
Electronic components have been selected such that they will function within specification during and after exposure to the expected ionization radiation environment.
This selection was based on review of radiation test data on same of similar part to sufficiently predict part behavior in the radiation of the Space Station. In the case of the metal-oxide-semiconductor sensing device, the internal thin oxide layer can be susceptible to Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR).
Hence, the following tests were performed and the device successfully passed ion radiation testing.
Gamma Total Ionizing Dose (TID) irradiation was tested at the Boeing Radiation Effects Laboratory (BREL) in Seattle, WA.
The radiation source was a J.L. Shepherd 81-221484
Irradiator (Co60 gamma irradiator), which was used to expose sensors to increasing levels of gamma radiation (Figure 8 ). Sensors were maintained at constant temperature using closed loop temperature control to simulate normal sensor operation. A lithium fluoride (LiF) dosimeter was used to calibrate the dose levels within the test fixture. Sensors were exposed to 1% hydrogen in air, then purged with air, prior to each radiation threshold. The radiation dose was provided at 10 rad(Si)/s, up to testing Sensors were mounted on a test fixture, shown in Figure 9 , which allowed the hydrogen sensors to be electrically biased before and after the radiation dose. The sensor fixture and sensors were heated for the duration of the test. The sensors were subjected to ion beams of '%Xe at two Linear Energy Transfer (LET) levels, 40.1 and 55.3 MeV*cm2/mg, which is in the energy range of cosmic ray ions. The LET levels of the xenon ions are based on testing with silicon. The total fluence of ions for each sensor was at least 4.0 x lo6 particles/cm2. In all cases, the sensors exhibited no performance shift during the tests. Proton irradiation testing was performed at the 76" Isochronous Cyclotron at the Crocker Nuclear Laboratory on the campus of the University of California at Davis ( Figure IO ). Devices were tested with a 1% hydrogenlbalance air calibration gas before and after exposure, but were not heated nor electrically biased during proton bombardment. Sensors were irradiated with a 61.6 MeV proton beam (calculated value) with increasing fluence levels of I O 9 and 1010particles/cm2. Five (5) sensors were tested at each fluence level. Up to fluence levels of 10AIO particleslcm2, the sensors showed no shift in baseline or sensitivity.
90-Dav Calibration Test
Since calibration data from the qualification program would not be available until late 2005, it was decided to utilize a Flight Like Development Unit (FLDU) to gain preliminary data. The FLDU utilized a single die processed from flight hardware and as wells as the latest screening and calibration procedures. A baseline data set was established and the unit was operated continuously for a minimum of 90 days on a development OGA system at MSFC ( Figure I? and Figure 12 ) for the purposes of gaining 
Figure 12: FLDU at MSFC
At the completion of 90 days, the hardware was returned to ME1 to assess the performance in relation to the baseline data. As of this writing, the reassessment is in process at MEI.
Integration Tests at HSSSI
The hydrogen sensor ORU was successfully integrated into the OGA system ( Figure 13 ) at HSSSI. Hydrogen was injected into the oxygen flow path and the ORU demonstrated its effectiveness to detect a simulated leak in the system causing the system to take action. As part of the OGA system, the ORU has demonstrated compliance to ISS EM1 conducted and susceptibility requirements and power quality testing as part of system level activity in June 2004.
ON-ORBIT LOGISTICS The 90-Day Calibration Cycle
Presently the 90-day calibration cycle means that at the completion of 90 days of ground and or on-orbit cumulative operation, the Hydrogen Sensor ORU must be removed from the OGA system in order to perform a re-calibration. This interval of time was established in the early phase of development and was primarily driven by repeatability and humidity test results. 
Installed
In addition to FLDU testing, plans are being developed with MSFC and ME1 to evaluate the feasibility of extending the 90-day calibration life to better facilitate the logistics of removing and replacing the ORU at every 90-day interval of operation.
The proposed plan would use the Qualification Unit to assess performance over multiple 90-day calibration cycles. With enough statistical data, there is reasonable belief that the calibration cycle can be lengthened.
I , .
* .
ExDosure to Moisture Work-Around As mentioned earlier, condensation of water in the hydrogen sensor ORU is not possible under normal operating conditions. While, it has been determined that there exists the possibility for condensed water to exist in the ORU under certain hardware shut down modes, this has necessitated ground and on-orbit work-arounds.
sensing element is in contact with liquid water and may be available to the program. Two flight units have been delivered to HSSSI and two more are expected by August 2005.
Future Sensor DeveloDment Planned
Currently work is underway on further improvements to the sensing element die for this application. Specifically modifications to the die structure are being evaluated to reduce the effect of humidity on the signal and to eliminate the potential for electrolysis on the surface of the die. These improvements are expected to be completed in 2005 and potentially be available to the program.
CONCLUSION
The Hydrogen Sensor ORU has progressed from the development stage to flight hardware and during that time substantial improvements in performance have been made. Understandings how the sensor performed under OGA environments was key those improvements. Sensitivity to moisture had represented a technical challenge to the MEI-HS team and this effect was significantly reduced through changes in the sensor's operation, calibration and screening procedures resulting in repeatable data over the expected humidity range.
Testing of the FLDU is intended to help assess the potential of extending the present 90-day calibration cycle. Additional tests are planed with the qualification unit to further evaluate extending this time through performance assessments over multiple 90-day calibration cycles. The overall goal is to reduce the frequency of on-orbit change outs of the Hydrogen Sensor ORU.
Development activity is underway to further reduce the sensitivity due to humidity and to eliminate the electrolysis effect when the
